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 CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ''EXECUTIVE'' 







For government to effectively govern, it needs instruments through which it can 
pursue public purposes and defined objectives.1 Generally, laws (legislation/by-laws) 
and policies have been identified, inter alia, as some of the types of instruments 
used by government to govern.2 For example, the Local Government: Municipal 
System Act3 provides that in governing a municipality a municipal council could 
exercise its executive and legislative authority by developing and adopting policies.4 
In general, governance instruments (including policies) are used to allocate 
resources, to regulate people's behaviour (inter alia by creating incentives, rights 
and duties) and to communicate government's understanding of society's collective 
problems and its vision for the future to the public.5 Despite the importance of 
policies as governance instruments,6 there seems to be uncertainty on the status 
and possible basis for the enforcement of ''executive'' policies that give effect to 
socio-economic rights in South Africa. In a recent article analysing a judgment of the 
                                                 
  Oliver Njuh Fuo. LLB (Hons) (University of Buea, Cameroon); LLM (NWU, Mafikeng Campus). 
Email: njuhfuo@gmail.com. The author is currently completing his doctoral studies at the NWU 
(Potchefstroom Campus). I want to thank Professor Louis Kotzé, Ms Rolien Roos and my 
Promoter, Professor Anél du Plessis, for commenting on the draft version of this article. I am 
grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. 
1  See Salamon 2000-2001 Fordham Urb LJ 1624; Linder and Peters ''Study of Policy Instruments'' 
33-34. 
2  See Steytler 2011 SAPL 484-496; Salamon 2000-2001 Fordham Urb LJ 1623-1641; Patel "Tools 
and Trade-offs" 363-368; Du Plessis 2010 Stell LR 274-275; Bovaird 2005 International Review 
of Administrative Sciences 217-221. 
3  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. Hereafter, the Systems Act. 
4  See s 11(3)(a) of the Systems Act. 
5  See Peters and Van Nispen ''Prologue'' 3; Linder and Peters ''Study of Policy Instruments'' 34; 
Salamon ''New Governance'' 1-41. 
6  For details, see Thornhill South African Public Administration 124-125; Cloete Public 
Administration and Management 91; Hanekom et al Key Aspects 25. 
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Constitutional Court,7 Professor David Bilchitz clearly raised this problem when he 
asserted that:8 
 
At the outset, it is important to recognise that the principle of subsidiarity as 
expressed by the court relates to the legislative instruments that are enacted 
to realise rights. Yet, when the court dealt with the applicants’ claim, it 
focused on their arguments in terms of chapters 12 and 13 of the National 
Housing Code. The latter document is not legislation, but policy. The manner 
in which the court dealt with the case suggests that it treated these policy 
documents as legislation. The principle of subsidiarity thus seems to have 
been broadened to include policy documents. This extension seems to have 
no clear justification. 
 
Although Bilchitz may have raised this problem from the point of view of the so-
called subsidiarity principle,9 this reveals a problem amongst some South African 
legal scholars. The perception exist amongst some of them that policies cannot be 
enforced in a court of law because they are ''policies'' and not ''law''.10 
 
The purpose of this article is to critically reflect on the status and possible 
constitutional basis for the enforceability of ''executive'' policies that give effect to 
socio-economic rights in South Africa. It argues that the constitutional basis for the 
enforceability of ''executive'' policies could be located inter alia in the positive duties 
                                                 
7  Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2010 4 BCLR 312 (CC) (hereafter Nokotyana). 
See Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 591-605. 
8  Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 598. Own emphasis. 
9  For details on the origins of the subsidiarity principle, see Friesen 2003 Federal Governance 5-6; 
Marquardt 1994 Fordham Int’l LJ 619-622. For a detailed discussion of the different versions of 
the principle of subsidiarity as developed by the Constitutional Court, see Van der Walt Property 
and Constitution 35-39, 46-112; Van der Walt 2008 Constitutional Court Review 99-116; Du 
Plessis 2006 Stell LR 207-231. 
10  See Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 598; Akani Garden Route (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Casino (Pty) Ltd 2001 
4 SA 501 (SCA) para 7 (hereafter Akani Garden Route); Minister of Education v Harris 2001 11 
BCLR 1157 (CC) (hereafter Minister of Education) paras 10-11. I have run into debates with 
some legal scholars who hold the view that ''policy'' cannot be enforced merely because it is 
''policy''. It was against the backdrop of such a debate with Theunis Meyer that I was given an 
opportunity by Professor Louis Kotze and other organisers of a conference on "The Regulation of 
Invasive Species - European and South African Perspectives" (4-6 November 2012, Seminaris 
Campus Hotel, Berlin) to share some of the findings of my ongoing research. I gave a short 
presentation entitled "Policies as a governance instrument in regulating invasive species: 
Comments from a South African constitutional perspective". In that presentation, I explained 
what constitutes the core of this article in relation to the regulation of invasive species. Although 
not directly related to the status of ''executive'' policies, Klare explains that in South Africa, the 
general tendency amongst conservative legal scholars and judges is to eschew "extra-legal 
factors" when interpreting and enforcing law – especially the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. See Klare 1998 SAJHR 158-172. 
ON FUO                                                                        PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
4 / 487 
of government (the state) imposed by sections 24(b), 25(5), 26(2) and 27(2) of the 
Constitution to ''take reasonable legislative and other measures'' within the context 
of available resources to give effect to relevant socio-economic rights.11 These 
positive duties appear to amount to a constitutional delegation of authority to the 
legislature and executive arms of government to concretise socio-economic rights. 
As such, it could be argued that, in practice, where ''executive'' policies should give 
content to socio-economic rights pursuant to powers delegated by original legislation 
that covers the field of socio-economic rights, such policies should have the force of 
law.12 
 
In order to achieve the above objective, this article is structured in three main parts. 
The first part draws from the work of some South African scholars on public 
administration to distinguish various types of policies and their legal status. It 
illustrates that when the executive adopts policies to give effect to legislative 
provisions, these constitute what is referred to as "executive" policies, which have 
the force of law. The second part explores the constitutional basis for enforcing 
''executive'' policies with specific reference to those that give effect to socio-
economic rights in South Africa. It begins by providing a brief overview of the socio-
economic rights contained in the Constitution and an explanation of the 
Constitutional Court's interpretation of the positive obligation imposed on 
government to ''take reasonable legislative and other measures'' to give effect to 
socio-economic rights. This is followed by a discussion on the powers of the 
legislature to further delegate law-making powers to the executive in giving effect to 
socio-economic rights. This discussion highlight the difficulty raised when the 
executive exercises delegated law-making powers in the form of an ''executive'' 
policy instead of ''regulations'', for example. The third part of the article provides an 
                                                 
11  It should be noted that the right of access to land and environmental rights guaranteed in 
sections 25(5) and 24 of the Constitution, respectively, are not expressly subject to progressive 
realisation. In addition, section 24 of the Constitution does not qualify the environmental rights 
as subject to available resources. 
12  The phrase "legislation that covers the field" is borrowed from Professor Van der Walt and used 
in this sense to refer to all legislation adopted to give effect to a socio-economic right in the Bill 
of Rights. See Van der Walt Property and Constitution 40-43; Van der Walt” 2008 Constitutional 
Court Review 100-103, 106-111. For details on the classification of legislation, see Du Plessis Re-
Interpretation of Statutes 25-61; Du Plessis 2011 PER 95-96. 
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overview of a selection of court cases that were decided based on ''executive'' 
policies, to demonstrate that such policies could give effect to socio-economic rights 
and that they are judicially enforceable. 
 
2 Types of policies in South Africa 
 
The idea of public policy-making originated from the United States of America and 
became increasingly popular following Woodrow Wilson's seminal lecture in 1886, 
which was later published as an article in 1887.13 Public policy-making focused on 
separating politics from administration and stressed the role of bureaucrats in 
managing public organisations and in ''translating policy ideals and aspirations into 
legislation, services, programmes, regulations, and so on''.14 In South Africa, policy 
studies ''is relatively recent and still evolving''.15 Due to the ambiguous nature of the 
word ''policy''16 this section does not venture into the many contentious definitions of 
the term17 but rather draws from the work of some South African experts on public 
administration to distinguish the various types of policies in the country. This 
distinction can help legal scholars understand the different policies that exist in the 
country and their associated status. In addition, this distinction will provide a 
foundation for a critical reflection on the possible constitutional basis for the 
enforceability of ''executive'' policies with specific reference to socio-economic rights. 
 
The first type of policy identified by Hattingh and Cloete is referred to as ''political 
policies''.18 This is the ''primary type'' of policy that is covered in most academic 
                                                 
13  See Wilson 1887 Political Science Quarterly 197-222. For a detailed discussion on the evolution 
of policy studies, see Wissink ''Policy Studies and Policy Analysis'' 56-74. 
14  Gumede "Public Policy Making in South Africa" 165. 
15  Gumede "Public Policy Making in South Africa" 166. For definitions of "policy studies" see De 
Coning ''Nature and Role of Public Policy'' 6-7. 
16  Akani Garden Route para 7. 
17  For some definitions, see Gumede "Public Policy Making in South Africa" 166-167; Hattingh 
Governmental Relations 55; De Coning ''Nature and Role of Public Policy'' 3-14. 
18  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Cloete Public Administration and Management 94; De 
Coning ''Nature and Role of Public Policy'' 15-16; Thornhill South African Public Administration 
127. 
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literature.19 Political policies can be represented as a plan of action adopted by a 
political party or the government in power and presented to the electorate/public as 
a series of value preferences which it seeks to implement upon election/re-election.20 
Such policies cannot be enforced irrespective of their content and at best remain the 
party's/government's vision for the future.21 This is the common view in academic 
literature, which draws largely from the manner in which public policy developed as 
a branch of public administration in the United States.22 According to Cloete, such 
policies could be seen as election slogans or convenient propaganda documents 
which may only be better formulated when tabled in Parliament as a Bill.23 From the 
above explanation, it seems that political policies can be further sub-divided into 
''government'' policies and ''party'' policies. Cloete indicates that when a political 
party decides to take part in an election, it examines community life and ''on the 
basis of its findings and the political beliefs of its members, it declares its stand on 
various issues''.24 This initial declaration is purely a ''party policy'' and reflects the 
beliefs of members of that political party.25 On the other hand, a government can 
transform a ''party policy'' into a ''government'' policy, outlining the government's 
vision for the country.26 Although government policies still adhere to party 
philosophy, they generally aim at promoting the collective welfare of society as a 
whole.27 Good examples of ''political'' policies include the ANC Freedom Charter,28 
                                                 
19  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55. The discussion by Gumede in Gumede "Public Policy 
Making in South Africa" 166-183 is a typical example in the South African context. See also 
Mokale and Scheepers Introduction to Developmental Local Government 51. 
20  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Thornhill South African Public Administration 127. 
21  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Cloete Public Administration and Management 94. 
22  See Venter "Administering National Government" 89-90; Gumede "Public Policy Making in South 
Africa" 165-183. 
23  Cloete Public Administration and Management 94; Thornhill South African Public Administration 
128. 
24  Cloete Public Administration and Management 94; Thornhill South African Public Administration 
128. 
25  Cloete Public Administration and Management 94; Thornhill South African Public Administration 
128. 
26  Cloete Public Administration and Management 94-95; Thornhill South African Public 
Administration 127-128. 
27  Thornhill South African Public Administration 128; De Coning and Cloete ''Theories and Models'' 
26. 
28  The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People in Kliptown on 26 June 1955. 
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the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme),29 the recent New Growth 
Path,30 and all ''White Papers''. 
 
A second type of policy is referred to as ''executive policy''.31 When an elected 
government translates a political policy into legislation, it then becomes the 
responsibility of ''political executive institutions'' and ''executive office-bearers'' to 
take the initiative to implement the legislation.32 Political executive institutions 
include "the Cabinet, Provincial Executive Councils and the executive 
mayor/executive committee of a municipal council".33 On the other hand, "executive 
office-bearers" include ministers and deputy ministers.34 It is the responsibility of 
executive office-bearers such as ministers to transform legislation into a form that is 
passed unto various government departments for implementation.35  This becomes 
relevant in instances where legislation explicitly requires a member of the executive 
arm of government such as a cabinet minister to adopt specific policies in order to 
give effect to specific legislative provisions.36 In other instances, legislation may 
require that the executive give meaning to some provisions through interpreting and 
delimiting the scope of application.37 Hattingh argues that "executive" policies are 
therefore implementable and enforceable.38 Such "executive" policies should 
complement, but ''cannot override, amend or be in conflict with" legislation.39 It is 
                                                 
29  See White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994) (GN 353 in GG 16085 of 23 
November 1994). This example is cited by Cloete. See Cloete Public Administration and 
Management 94; Thornhill South African Public Administration 128. 
30  National Planning Commission 2011 www.npconline.co.za. This example is cited by Cloete in 
Thornhill South African Public Administration 128. 
31  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; De Coning ''Nature and Role of Public Policy'' 15-16; Cloete 
Public Administration and Management 46-47. 
32  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Cloete Public Administration and Management 46-47, 95-
96; Thornhill South African Public Administration 129. 
33  See Cloete Public Administration and Management 92-94; Thornhill South African Public 
Administration 126-127. 
34  See Cloete Public Administration and Management 92-94; Thornhill South African Public 
Administration 126-127. 
35  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55. See Cloete Public Administration and Management 46-47, 
95-96; Thornhill South African Public Administration 129. 
36  See Cloete Public Administration and Management 95; Thornhill South African Public 
Administration 129. 
37  See Thornhill South African Public Administration 130. 
38  See Hattingh Governmental Relations 55. This view is endorsed by Cloete in his distinction 
between the functions of political executive institutions and administrative executive institutions. 
See Cloete Public Administration and Management 46. 
39  See Akani Garden Route para 7. 
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also important to note that enforceable "executive" policies can also emanate from 
negotiations between the executive (especially in municipalities) and the public 
(community residents) with regard to the content of a socio-economic right that the 
executive seeks to provide.40 Examples of "executive" policies in South Africa include 
national and municipal indigent policies which specifically give effect to the socio-
economic rights of poor households by catering for their basic needs such as water, 
sanitation and electricity.41 Municipalities are empowered to use their executive 
powers, which include designing, adopting and implementing policies, when 
administering local government matters listed in schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution.42 
 
The National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) remains a framework 
executive policy which sets out minimum standards which municipalities must realise 
for poor households.43 In terms of the obligations imposed on municipalities to 
provide essential services to poor households,44 each municipality is required to put 
in place the infrastructure required to ensure the supply of 25 litres of potable water 
per person per day, supplied within 200 metres of a household and with a minimum 
flow of 10 litres per minute (in the case of communal points) or 6000 litres of 
potable water supplied per formal connection per month (in the case of a yard or 
house connections). This is referred to as basic water supply facility.45 This 
obligation speaks to the minimum content of the right of access to water for indigent 
                                                 
40  See Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 3 BLCR 239 (CC) (hereafter Mazibuko) paras 70-72 
for similar reasoning. Gumede acknowledges that policies ''can come about through informal 
processes and bargaining''. See Gumede "Public Policy Making in South Africa" 166. This type of 
agreement could emanate from "meaningful engagement" that was developed by the 
Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC) (hereafter Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road). See paras 13-21. For more reading on the concept of meaningful engagement, see: 
Chenwi 2011 SAPL 128-156; Muller 2011 Stell LR 742-758; Holness 2011 SAPL 1-36. 
41  National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006). 
42  See s 156(1)(a) of the Constitution and 11(3)(a) of the Systems Act. The matters outlined in 
Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution include: electricity and gas reticulation; air pollution; 
municipal healthcare services; water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply 
systems and domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems; stormwater management; and 
municipal planning. For details, see s 156(1) read with Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. 
43  National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 6; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 1. 
44  See National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21-23. 
45  National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 17. 
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households, subject to justification. The adequacy of this content in the City of 
Johannesburg's indigent policy was a fact in issue in Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg.46 
 
Secondly, each municipality is obliged to sustainably manage a basic water supply 
facility so as to ensure that water supply is available for at least 350 days per year 
and not interrupted for more than 48 consecutive hours per incident and to 
communicate to the public the importance of good water use, hygiene and related 
practices. This is referred to as a basic water supply service.47 Although this 
requirement can be rightly seen as a positive obligation imposed on local 
government to take action that will ensure and sustain access to the right of access 
to sufficient water, it can also be seen as imposing a negative obligation on 
municipalities to refrain from actions that will impede the enjoyment of the right of 
access to water. 
 
Thirdly, each municipality is obliged to provide indigent households with a basic 
sanitation facility which is safe, reliable, private, protected from the weather and 
ventilated and which keeps smells to the minimum. 48 In addition, the basic 
sanitation facility should be easy to keep clean, and should minimise the risks of the 
spread of sanitation-related diseases by facilitating the proper treatment and/or 
removal of human waste and wastewater in a manner that is environmentally 
sound.49 Moreover, municipalities are obliged to sustainably operate the basic 
sanitation facilities provided to the indigents. This includes the safe removal of 
human waste and waste water from premises where this is appropriate and 
necessary, and the communication of good sanitation, hygiene and related practices 
to community members.50 
                                                 
46  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 3 BLCR 239 (CC) paras 52-58, 61. 
47  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 17. 
48  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 17. 
49  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 17. 
50  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 21; Draft Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policy (2005) 17. 
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Furthermore, in relation to electricity, the National Framework for Municipal Indigent 
Policies obliges municipalities to provide indigent households with ''sufficient energy 
to allow for lighting, access to media and cooking''.51 The content of electricity to be 
supplied to indigent households is the national minimum of 50 kWh per household 
per month. The National Framework for Indigent Policies acknowledges that this 
basic level of electricity may not be sufficient to cover all basic needs, including 
cooking.52 In addition, other experts have expressed serious doubts about the 
adequacy of this amount of electricity in satisfying the basic needs especially of poor 
households in urban areas, in the absence of other supplementary sources of 
energy.53 
 
The above remain basic service levels which are subject to revision and increase by 
national government, in consultation with other spheres of government, periodically 
in accordance with changing circumstances.54 Municipalities that can afford it are at 
liberty to provide higher service levels.55 Basic service levels also vary across 
settlement conditions in the sense that ''what is appropriate in a deep rural area will 
not be appropriate in an inner city situation''. For example, while wells or public 
standpipes may be appropriate to ensure water supply in a deep rural area, metered 
household connections are more suitable to urban centres.56 Therefore, it is 
expected that municipalities would give context specific content to local indigent 
policies.57 What is important to note in the context of this article is that, although 
indigent policies remain a "policy" adopted by the executive to give effect to some 
socio-economic rights, they have a legal status and can be enforced in court. This 
was the subject of litigation in the famous Mazibuko cases. The constitutional basis 
                                                 
51  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 22. 
52  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 23. 
53  For a detailed analysis, see Adam Free Basic Electricity; Pillay et al Democracy and Delivery; 
McDonald Electric Capitalism. 
54  National Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policies (2006) 23. 
55  Draft Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policy (2005) 18-19. 
56  Draft Framework for a Municipal Indigent Policy (2005) 19; National Framework for a Municipal 
Indigent Policies (2006) 23-24. 
57  The Constitutional Court has held that, in giving effect to socio-economic rights, the social and 
historical context should be taken into account, because what is appropriate in rural areas may 
not be appropriate in urban areas, for example. See Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) (hereafter Grootboom) paras 22-25, 37. 
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for the enforcement of executive policies will be explored in the second part of this 
article with specific reference to socio-economic rights. 
 
The third type of policy is ''administrative''.58 For an executive policy emanating from 
''the highest authority to be duly implemented'', it must be accompanied by an 
administrative policy to guide government departments and municipalities on the 
practical steps to be followed in effectively and correctly implementing that executive 
policy.59 From this angle, Hattingh perceives ''administrative'' policy as a third genre 
of policy which is unenforceable per se.60 In order words, these are internal policy 
documents or administrative guidelines which may have the force of law and give 
directions on how sub-ordinate staff members should approach certain tasks.61 
Examples of such guidelines could include the various Integrated Development 
Planning Guidelines62 and Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Indigent 
Policy.63 Although administrative policies are not enforceable per se,64 their 
implementation constitutes administrative action which can be subjected to judicial 
review. 65 
 
This researcher believes the above classification of policies and the discussion that 
follows may help in clarifying the confusion surrounding the status especially of 
executive policies that give effect to socio-economic rights in South Africa and the 
basis for their enforcement. This is important given the fact that, just as in most 
                                                 
58  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; De Coning ''Nature and Role of Public Policy'' 15-16. 
59  See Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Cloete Public Administration and Management 96-97; 
Thornhill South African Public Administration 131. 
60  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55. 
61  See Hattingh Governmental Relations 55; Cloete Public Administration and Management 96-97; 
Thornhill South African Public Administration 131; Baxter 1993 Administrative Law Reform 177. 
62  See for example DPLG Date Unknown iphone.cogta.gov.za. 
63  Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Indigent Policy by Municipalities (2006). 
64  Hattingh Governmental Relations 55. 
65  See Hoexter Administrative Law 177-178; Baxter 1993 Administrative Law Reform 178. This will 
be based on s 33(1) of the Constitution which guarantees everyone "the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair". For a detailed discussion of the scope of 
what constitutes administrative action under the Constitution and the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), see Hoexter Administrative Law 175-251. For 
examples on how the Constitutional Court has interpreted and applied the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, see: Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive 
Committee, Association of State-aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 BCLR 151 (CC) paras 
30-42; Walele v City of Cape Town 2008 11 BCLR 1067 (CC) paras 27-42. See also Plasket 
Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action 81-108; Roux 2003 Democratisation 103-105. 
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other modern states, there is an increasing delegation of powers to the executive 
arm of government,66 which is the head of government administration, to make rules 
and regulations in order to effectively implement legislation.67 Through the discharge 
of its executive and administrative powers, the contact of the executive arm of 
government with society in general is ever-present. As Woodrow Wilson once 
asserted, "administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government 
in action, it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government".68 
Due to the increasing delegation of regulatory powers to the executive, the 
executive and administrative arm of government has witnessed remarkable growth 
in importance, performing most of the "minor" legislative functions of parliament.69 
Although this may not sit well with the traditional application of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, this generally indicates that the executive performs both 
administrative and legislative functions.70 
 
3 The constitutional basis for enforcing "executive policies" 
 
This part of the article critically reflects on the possible constitutional basis for the 
enforceability of "executive" policies that give effect to socio-economic rights in 
South Africa. It begins by identifying the socio-economic rights entrenched in the 
Constitution. 
 
3.1 Socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
 
The socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights include the rights of 
access to housing;71 healthcare services, including reproductive health care; 
                                                 
66  See 3.3 below for examples of legislation delegating such authority to the executive. 
67  Plasket Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action 109-112. 
68  Woodrow Wilson as quoted in Coetzee Public Administration 3. 
69  Plasket Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action 112. 
70  For a detailed discussion of "administrative action" and the complexities of distinguishing 
between the legislative and administrative functions of the executive, see Plasket Fundamental 
Right to Just Administrative Action 121-166. 
71  Section 26 of the Constitution provides that: "(1) Everyone has the right to have access to 
adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. (3) No one may be 
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sufficient food and water; social security and social assistance;72 further education;73 
access to land on an equitable basis;74 environmental rights;75 and the right of 
detainees and prisoners to conditions of detention that are consistent with human 
dignity and to have at state expense, adequate accommodation, nutrition, medical 
treatment and reading material.76 Furthermore, in Joseph v City of Johannesburg,77 
the Constitutional Court used existing constitutional and legislative provisions that 
oblige local government to provide basic services to community residents to 
establish a (constitutional) right to electricity.78 The reasoning of the Court in Joseph 
could also be interpreted to establish a (constitutional) right to sanitation,79 
independent of other related but self-standing rights.80 However, in Nokotyana, the 
Constitutional Court declined to make a finding on the applicant's submission that 
the right to sanitation is integral to the constitutional right of access to adequate 
housing.81 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after 
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions". 
72  Section 27 of the Constitution provides that: "(1) Everyone has the right to have access to- (a) 
healthcare services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) 
social security, including if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, 
appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. (3) 
No one may be refused emergency medical treatment". 
73  Section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that: "Everyone has the right - to further education, 
which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and 
accessible". 
74  Section 25(5) of the Constitution provides that: "The state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis". 
75  Section 24 of the Constitution provides that: "Everyone has the right – (a) to an environment 
that is not harmful to their health or well being; and (b) to have the environment protected for 
the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures 
that (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development". 
76  See s 35(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
77  Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 3 BCLR 212 (CC) (hereafter Joseph). 
78  Joseph paras 34-40. In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2009 9 BCLR 847 (CC) (hereafter Residents of Joe Slovo Community), Justice Sachs indicated 
that the socio-economic rights obligations established by the Constitution and legislation create a 
special cluster of legal relationships between municipalities and homeless people occupying 
municipal land. See paras 343-344. 
79  See Joseph paras 34-40. 
80  Nokotyana paras 46-49. 
81  Nokotyana para 47. 
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As will become evident in the discussion that follows, the socio-economic rights 
contained in the Constitution are abstract entitlements which become meaningful 
entitlements only when government adopts legislation, policies, plans and 
programmes to give effect to them.82 Without these processes of translation, the 
socio-economic rights remain vague guarantees. 
 
3.2 The duty to take "reasonable legislative and other measures" 
 
The abstract nature of socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution requires 
that they should be translated into concrete enforceable legal rights.83 In addition to 
the duty to respect, protect, promote and fulfill socio-economic rights,84 the 
Constitution imposes an obligation on the government to adopt "reasonable 
legislative and other measures" to give effect to the rights guaranteed inter alia in 
sections 24, 25(5), 26(1) and 27(1). Read jointly, these provisions create "an open-
ended" duty with significant initiative left in the hands of public authorities to realise 
socio-economic rights.85 The task to concretise abstract constitutional guarantees 
into concrete entitlements is supposed to be executed broadly by the legislature, the 
executive and state administration, and their respective organs of state, through 
various processes.86 In terms of local government, for example, this obligation 
entails that, in addition to by-laws, local government should adopt policies, plans, 
programmes and strategies that would contribute to the realisation of socio-
                                                 
82  Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 12, 14; Pieterse 2010 Law, Democracy and 
Development 231-232. 
83  Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 12, 14; Pieterse 2010 Law, Democracy and 
Development 231-232. 
84  See s 7(2) of the Constitution. For a detailed discussion of these obligations, see Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 80-87. 
85  Du Plessis 2010 Stell LR 269. 
86  Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 12; Pieterse 2010 Law, Democracy and 
Development 231-232. In reflecting on the limits of socio-economic rights litigation in realising 
the transformative potential of the Constitution, Liebenberg recognises the primary duty of the 
legislature and the executive to adopt and implement measures that will lead to the realisation of 
socio-economic rights with courts largely playing an interpretative but transformative role. She 
argues that: "An approach premised on the courts possessing all the answers on how best to 
realise socio-economic rights, can also have negative repercussions for democratic 
transformation. The likely effect is to induce legislative and executive lethargy, and an abdication 
of the primary role of these branches under the Constitution to give effect to socio-economic 
rights guaranteed by formulating and implementing social legislation and programmes through 
broadly participative processes". See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 40. 
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economic rights.87 This is consistent with the executive and legislative authority of 
municipalities generally outlined in section 11(3) of the Systems Act. 
 
Although the term "reasonable" has not been defined by the Constitutional Court,88 
the Court has outlined several conditions that must be satisfied before legislative and 
other measures adopted to realise socio-economic rights can be considered to be 
reasonable.89 Firstly, according to the Court, the government must put in place 
comprehensive legislation, policies and programmes to realise socio-economic 
rights.90 Such legislation, policies and programmes must be reasonable from 
conception to implementation and must be backed by a strong commitment to 
realise socio-economic rights.91 
 
Secondly, in view of the fact that the Constitution creates three distinct but 
interrelated and interdependent spheres of government92 tasked inter alia with the 
same constitutional mandate to realise constitutional rights through a system of co-
operative governance,93 reasonable legislative and other measures aimed at realising 
constitutional socio-economic rights must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to 
the different spheres of government and ensure that appropriate financial and 
human resources are available to execute assigned responsibilities.94 Responsibilities 
should be allocated after consultation between all spheres of government and must 
be guided by national framework legislation.95 
 
Thirdly, the legislative and other measures adopted by government must establish 
coherent programmes directed towards and capable of progressively realising socio-
                                                 
87  Du Plessis and Du Plessis "Balancing of Sustainability Interests" 432. 
88  Iles 2004 SAJHR 455-457 
89  See Grootboom para 39-44. 
90  Grootboom para 42. 
91  Grootboom para 42. 
92  Section 40(1) of the Constitution outlines the three spheres of government. 
93  For details on the principles of cooperative government, see ss 40(2) and 41 of the Constitution; 
Du Plessis 2008 SAPL 90-92; Layman 2003 www.sarpn.org 8; De Visser "Institutional Subsidiarity 
in the Constitution" 2-3, 11-12; De Villiers and Sindane Cooperative Government; De Visser 
Developmental Local Government 209-254; Kirkby et al 2007 SAPL 144; Bekink Principles of 
South African Local Government Law 89-94. 
94  Grootboom para 38. 
95  Grootboom paras 40, 66. 
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economic rights for all, within the state's available resources. The Court has 
expressed the view that the "contours and content of the measures to be adopted 
are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive", who must ensure that 
such measures are reasonable.96 This expression of the Court seems to suggest that 
the executive can use the governance instruments at its disposal to determine the 
content and scope/"contour" of socio-economic rights. The Court has indicated that 
one of its main concerns is to ensure that there was meaningful engagement in the 
design and implementation of such legislation and policies.97 In Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road, the Court linked the obligation of municipalities to involve communities 
in local governance to "meaningful engagement".98 The Court defined meaningful 
engagement as a two-way process in which the City of Johannesburg and those 
about to become homeless would talk to each other meaningfully in order to achieve 
certain objectives.99 It held that meaningful engagement has the potential to 
contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to "increased understanding and 
sympathetic care" if both sides are willing to participate in the process. The Court 
noted that people may be so vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the 
importance of engagement and may refuse to take part in the process. The Court 
held that if this happens, a municipality cannot merely walk away but must make 
reasonable efforts to engage with such vulnerable people and it is only if these 
reasonable efforts fail that a municipality may proceed without appropriate 
engagement. The Court stated that because the engagement process precisely seeks 
to ensure that a city is able to engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate 
people, that process should preferably be managed by careful and sensitive 
people.100 It held that the failure of the City to engage with the occupiers was 
contrary to the spirit and purport of the Constitution, a violation of the right to 
human dignity, as well as other socio-economic rights obligations imposed by the 
                                                 
96  Grootboom para 41. Own emphasis. See also B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 6 BCLR 
789 (CC) (hereafter B v Minister) paras 32, 34. 
97  See Residents of Joe Slovo Community paras 236-245; Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly 2006 12 BCLR 1399 (CC) paras 123-125, 129-134; Occupiers of 51 
Olivia Road paras 14-15. 
98  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road paras 13-15. 
99  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 14. 
100  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 15. 
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Constitution.101 Yacoob J stressed that where a municipality's strategy, policy or plan 
is expected to affect a large number of people, there is a greater need for 
"structured, consistent and careful engagement".102 The Court further observed that 
the process of meaningful engagement can work only if both sides act reasonably 
and in good faith.103 The Court cautioned that community residents who approach 
the engagement process with an intransigent attitude or with unreasonable and non-
negotiable demands may stall the engagement process. Municipalities must not 
perceive vulnerable groups and individuals as a "disempowered mass" but rather 
encourage them to be pro-active rather than being purely defensive. The Court 
expressed the view that civil society organisations that champion the cause of social 
justice should preferably facilitate the engagement process in every possible way.104  
Lastly, the Court indicated that secrecy is inimical to the constitutional value of 
openness and counter-productive to the process of meaningful engagement.105 This 
requires that in negotiating a policy, plan or programme that affects the rights of 
communities, municipalities must furnish complete and accurate information that will 
enable affected communities to reach reasonable decisions.106 The objectives of 
meaningful engagement would differ from one context to another.107 
 
In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Justice Ngcobo asserted that in implementing 
any programme giving effect to socio-economic rights, the key requirement which 
must be met is meaningful engagement between the government and residents.108 
This requirement flows from the need to treat community residents with respect and 
care for their inherent human dignity as well as the need for government to 
ascertain the needs and concerns of individual households.109 The process of 
meaningful engagement does not require the parties to agree on every issue. What 
is required of the parties is that they should approach the engagement process in 
                                                 
101  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 16. 
102  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 19. Own emphasis. 
103  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 20. 
104  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 20. 
105  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 21. 
106  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 21. 
107  Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road para 14. See also Residents of Joe Slovo Community paras 241-242. 
108  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 238. 
109  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 238. 
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good faith and reasonableness and should understand the concerns of the other 
side.110 Meaningful engagement can be achieved only if all the parties approach the 
process in good faith and a willingness to listen, and where possible, to 
accommodate one another. Justice Ngcobo stressed that the goal of meaningful 
engagement is to find a mutually acceptable solution to the difficulties confronting 
the government and citizens in the quest to realise socio-economic rights.111 The 
need for structured and concerted engagement was equally emphasised by Justice 
Ngcobo when he observed that different messages and perhaps conflicting 
information from officials of all three spheres of government conveyed to residents 
of Joe Slovo created misunderstanding and distrust in the minds of the residents 
regarding the relocation project.112 Even though mutual understanding and 
accommodation of each others' concerns remains the primary focus of meaningful 
engagement, the decision ultimately lies with government. However, government 
must ensure that the decision is informed by the concerns raised by the residents 
during the process of engagement.113 In view of the above pronouncements from 
the Constitutional Court, it has been argued that meaningful engagement has 
emerged as a requirement of the reasonableness standard.114 
 
In addition to the above requirements, the Constitutional Court has indicated that 
reasonable measures directed towards realising socio-economic rights must take into 
consideration the objectives of the Constitution, the multi-dimensional nature and 
prevalence of poverty in South Africa and the capacity of institutions responsible for 
implementing social legislation and policies.115 The legislation and policies adopted to 
give effect to socio-economic rights must be balanced and flexible and must pay 
attention to short-, medium- and long-term needs. Any social programme that 
excludes, for example, a significant segment of society, especially the poor, cannot 
be said to be reasonable.116 According to the Court, reasonableness must be 
                                                 
110  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 244. 
111  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 244. 
112  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 247. 
113  Residents of Joe Slovo Community para 244. 
114  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 153-154. 
115  Grootboom para 43. 
116  Grootboom paras 43, 56 and 63. 
ON FUO                                                                        PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
19 / 487 
understood in the context of the objectives and values of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights as a whole.117 The Court reasoned that: 118 
 
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and 
extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose 
needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is 
most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving the 
realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of 
reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a 
statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the 
Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. 
If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs 
of those most desperate, they may not pass the test. 
 
In view of the above, and by way of analogy, any challenge based on sections 24(b), 
25(5), 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution in which it is argued that the state failed 
to meet the positive obligations imposed on it by these constitutional provisions, 
courts will have to simply decide if the legislative and other measures adopted are 
reasonable, taking into consideration the available resources. According to the 
Court:119 
 
A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more 
desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether 
public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether 
the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the 
state to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of 
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement 
is met. 
 
The above extract demonstrates the very flexible nature of the reasonableness 
standard. It clearly indicates that government can use a variety of measures to 
realise socio-economic rights. It should be stressed that the Court expressed the 
view that the content and contours of socio-economic rights are best determined by 
the executive and the legislature.120 In view of the fact that policy constitutes the 
                                                 
117  Grootboom para 83. 
118  Grootboom para 44. 
119  Grootboom para 41. 
120  Grootboom para 41. 
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main governance instrument for executive office-bearers, this implies that where the 
executive adopts specific policies to give effect to socio-economic rights, the 
executive acts within the prescripts of the Constitution. This constitutional context 
informs Brand's argument that where the executive adopts policies that create 
concrete socio-economic rights or entitlements to particular social goods for defined 
categories of persons, it becomes easier for them to be claimed and for the courts to 
uphold such claims.121 To borrow from Cloete, the Constitution "declares what action 
specified institutions and office bearers are to take in accordance with prescribed 
procedures".122 The duty on the executive to adopt measures, including policies, to 
give effect to socio-economic rights is informed by the Constitution. What must be 
stressed from the Court's jurisprudence for the purpose of our discussion is the 
reality that the "contours and content" of the measures adopted to give effect to 
socio-economic rights are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive, 
subject to the standard of reasonableness.123 In addition, the criteria used by the 
Constitutional Court to determine the reasonableness of measures implemented to 
give effect to socio-economic rights are non-exhaustive.124 
 
3.3 Delegation of legislative powers to the executive in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the legislative authority of the national sphere of government is 
vested in Parliament as set out in section 44 of the Constitution.125 In terms of the 
provincial sphere of government, the legislative authority is vested in provincial 
legislatures.126 Lastly, the legislative authority of the local sphere of government is 
vested in municipal councils.127 As deliberative bodies, Parliament, provincial 
legislatures and municipalities exercise original legislative authority and can adopt, of 
their own volition, any law/legislation on any matter falling within their respective 
                                                 
121  See Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 13-14; Mazibuko para 66; and Nokotyana 
paras 47-51. 
122  See Thornhill South African Public Administration 124. 
123  See Grootboom para 41; B v Minister paras 32, 34 
124  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 223. 
125  See s 43(a) read with s 44 of the Constitution. 
126  See s 43(b) read with s 104 of the Constitution. 
127  See s 43(c) read with s 156 of the Constitution. 
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areas of competence.128 This is referred to as original legislation.129 Although it is not 
expressly stated in the Constitution, just as under the Interim Constitution,130 it is 
constitutionally permissible for (original) legislation adopted by these bodies to 
contain enabling provisions which delegate powers to members of the executive 
branch of government to adopt subordinate legislation (such as regulations) in the 
process of implementation.131 This means that by virtue of enabling provisions in 
legislation, a member of the executive branch of government or any other 
functionary could be assigned powers to further make laws. For example, in 
Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill, Langa DP (as he then was) made 
this clear when he asserted that:132 
 
Regulations are a category of subordinate legislation framed and 
implemented by a functionary or body other than the legislature for the 
purpose of implementing valid legislation. Such functionaries are usually 
members of the executive branch of government, but not invariably so. A 
legislature has the power to delegate the powers to make regulations to 
functionaries when such regulations are necessary to supplement the 
primary legislation. Ordinarily the functionary will be the President or the 
Premier or the member of the executive responsible for the implementation 
of the law… The factors relevant to a consideration of whether the 
delegation of law-making power is appropriate are many. They include the 
nature and ambit of the delegation, the identity of the person or institution 
to whom the power is delegated, and the subject matter of the delegated 
power. 
 
Although the power to delegate law-making functions to the executive branch of 
government raises difficult questions relating to the traditional application of the 
                                                 
128  Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 45-47. It should be noted that, apart from legislation 
which may emanate from the deliberative procedures of Parliament, certain provisions of the 
Constitution prescribe that Parliament should adopt subsidiary constitutional legislation. 
According to Du Plessis, subsidiary constitutional legislation should be enacted in order to "give 
more concrete effect to key provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. See Du Plessis 
2011 PER 95-96. An example of such legislation is PAJA, that was enacted by Parliament to give 
effect to s 33(3) of the Constitution. 
129  Du Plessis 2011 PER 95-96; Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 32-37, 45. 
130  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
131  See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 37-41; Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions 
Bill 2001 11 BCLR 1126 (CC) para 19; Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v President of 
the Republic of South Africa 1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC) (hereafter Executive Council, Western 
Cape Legislature) 51. See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-45; 
Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 8 BCLR 872 (CC) paras 109, 113. 
132  Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill 2001 11 BCLR 1126 (CC) para 19. 
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doctrine of separation of powers,133 this practice is inevitable in a modern state, 
where parliament may be too busy with law–making processes and therefore unable 
to attend to dynamic changes in society. Within the context of the Interim 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court held in Executive Council, Western Cape 
Legislature that for the purposes of good governance, it was constitutionally 
permissible for an Act of Parliament to delegate law-making powers to the 
executive.134 The Court stated that:135 
 
In a modern state detailed provisions are often required for the purpose of 
implementing and regulating laws, and parliament cannot be expected to deal with 
all such matters itself. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits 
Parliament from delegating subordinate regulatory authority to other bodies. The 
power to do so is necessary for effective law-making. It is implicit in the power to 
make laws for the country and I have no doubt that under our Constitution 
parliament can pass legislation delegating such legislative functions to other bodies. 
There is, however, a difference between delegating authority to make subordinate 
legislation within the framework of a statute under which the delegation is made, 
and assigning plenary legislative power to another body. 
 
Despite the above finding, there are limitations on the legislative authority that 
parliament could delegate.136 The Constitutional Court has indicated that, in any 
given case, the question of whether or not Parliament is entitled to delegate sub-
regulatory authority must depend on whether or not the Constitution permits the 
delegation.137 To the Court, this is based on the fact that, "the authority of 
Parliament to make laws, and so too to delegate that function, is subject to the 
Constitution".138 This means that the decision as to whether Parliament may 
delegate regulatory authority depends on the language and context of the 
empowering constitutional/legislative provision.139 In any case, the exercise of sub-
regulatory authority by a member of the executive branch of government or any 
                                                 
133  The Court has indicated that the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot be construed as 
absolute in the South African context. See Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill 2001 
11 BCLR 1126 (CC) para 25. 
134  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature para 51. 
135  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature para 51. 
136  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-45 to 17-47. 
137  Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa, Freedom Under the 
Kaw v President of the Republic of South Africa, Centre for Applied Legal Studies v President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2011 10 BCLR 1017 (CC) (hereafter Justice Alliance) para 54. 
138  Justice Alliance para 54. 
139  See Justice Alliance paras 54-58. 
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relevant functionary must be consistent with the empowering provision of the 
Constitution or relevant legislation.140 
 
Another important factor which must be taken into consideration is the nature and 
extent of the delegation.141 The Court has indicated that the primary reason for 
delegation is to ensure that the legislature is not overwhelmed by the need to 
determine minor regulatory details. Delegation therefore relieves the legislature from 
dealing with detailed provisions that are often required for the purpose of 
implementing and regulating laws.142 Thus, the legislature may delegate subordinate 
regulatory authority to the executive but may not assign plenary legislative power to 
the executive.143 The legislature can therefore delegate "the determination of mere 
minor detail" to the executive but cannot "shift" all its law-making power to the 
executive.144  According to the Court, the legislature "may not ordinarily delegate its 
essential legislative functions" to the executive in a constitutional democracy.145 This 
limitation is informed by the delegation doctrine, which is informed by the doctrine 
of the separation of powers. The delegation doctrine requires that law-making, 
which is a proper function of the legislature, "should not be delegated excessively to 
the executive branch of government".146 In addition, this restraint is intended to 
balance "the need for efficiency in government against the need to avoid subverting 
the constitutional legislative framework".147 It is acknowledged that the potential of 
such transfer does not sit easily with the traditional notions of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers.148 
 
The above paragraphs demonstrate that, as under the Interim Constitution, it is 
constitutionally permissible under the Constitution for the legislature to delegate 
legislative authority to the executive. When such delegated authority is exercised it 
                                                 
140  See Justice Alliance para 60; Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 38. 
141  Justice Alliance para 61. 
142  Justice Alliance para 65. See Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 38. 
143  See Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature para 51; Justice Alliance para 61; Bishop and 
Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-45 to 17-47. 
144  Justice Alliance para 62. 
145  Justice Alliance para 62; Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 49. 
146  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-45 to17-46. 
147  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-45 to17-47. 
148  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-49. 
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has the force of law and the main question which should be addressed is whether 
there is constitutional or legislative authority to delegate the power in question to 
the executive (the minister, for example).149 As Bishop and Raboshakga put it, the 
discretion of the executive to exercise sub-regulatory authority or draft laws remains 
valid as long as ''it does not alter the text of the legislation" and "there is no specific 
constitutional mandate for the legislature to act''.150 This means that the executive 
has discretion on how it exercises its sub-regulatory power provided such power and 
discretion does not conflict with the delegating legislation or the Constitution. There 
is therefore no prescribed manner in which the executive should exercise delegated 
regulatory authority except that it should comply with principles of delegating 
legislation and the Constitution. The subsequent paragraphs show that this 
discretion enables ministers to exercise sub-regulatory authority in the form of 
''regulations'', ''strategies'', ''policies'', ''notices'' and even ''lists''. 
 
In South Africa, original legislation that seeks to give effect to socio-economic rights 
is replete with provisions delegating sub-regulatory authority to the executive. In the 
area of social assistance, for example, section 5(1)(c) of the Social Assistance Act151 
provides that the Minister of Social Development, in concurrence with the Minister of 
Finance, can prescribe a category of persons who are not South Africans to be 
beneficiaries of social assistance programmes.152 In addition, in terms of section 5(2) 
of the Social Assistance Act, the Minister of Social Development in agreement with 
the Minister of Finance may prescribe additional requirements in respect inter alia of 
income threshold, means testing, and age limits. In terms of section 16(2) of Social 
Assistance Act the minister may prescribe circumstances where persons absent from 
South Africa can continue to receive grants. In the area of housing, the Housing 
Act153 requires that the Minister of Human Settlements must determine national 
housing policy which includes national "norms and standards" in respect of 
                                                 
149  See Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature paras 117, 122-125; Justice Alliance paras 54-
69. 
150  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-49. 
151  Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004. 
152  This power has not yet been exercised. 
153  Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
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housing.154 In terms of section 4(1) and (2), of the Housing Act, the national policy 
must be contained in the National Housing Code (2009) which must also be 
published by the Minister of Human Settlement.155 In the area of environmental 
legislation, Chapter 2 of the National Water Act156 delegates powers to the Minister 
of Water and Environmental Affairs to develop a national water resource strategy 
(after consultation with society at large) to facilitate the proper management of 
water resources and clearly states that this strategy "is binding on all authorities and 
institutions exercising powers or performing duties under this Act".157 In addition, in 
terms of section 56 of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 
(NEMBA),158 the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs has the powers to list 
species that are in need of national protection.159 The "list" published by the Minister 
of Water and Environmental Affairs pursuant to section 56 of NEMBA has the force 
of law because in terms of section 57 of NEMBA, any person carrying out a restricted 
activity involving listed threatened or protected species without a permit will be in 
violation of the law. In terms of local government legislation, section 108(1) of the 
Systems Act grants the Minister of the Department of Cooperative Government and 
Traditional Affairs powers to set essential minimum or national standards, in 
consultation with relevant stakeholders, for the provision of free services to poor 
households in situations where framework legislation does not clearly define such 
                                                 
154  See s 3(2)(a) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
155  DHS 2009 www.dhs.gov.za. Volume 3 of the National Housing Code (2009) entitled "Financial 
Interventions" details the extent to which government will provide individual housing subsidies to 
eligible citizens and permanent residents as well as the qualifying criteria. In addition, the 
National Housing Code (2009) details different forms of housing assistance and eligibility criteria 
for farm workers. See Volume 5 (Rural Interventions: Farm Resident Subsidies) of the National 
Housing Code (2009) 23-30. 
156  National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
157  See Preamble of Chapter 2 and ss 5 and 6 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
158  National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA). 
159  Section 56 of NEMBA provides that: "56(1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette publish a 
list of – (a) Critically endangered species, being any indigenous species facing an extremely high 
risk of extinction in the wild in the immediate future; (b) endangered species, being any 
indigenous species facing a high risk of extinction in the wild in the near future, although they 
are not a critically endangered species; (c) vulnerable species, being indigenous species facing 
an extreme risk of extinction in the wild in the medium term future, although they are not a 
critically endangered species; and (d) protected species, being of any species which are of such 
high conservation value or national protection, although they are not listed in terms of paragraph 
(a),(b) and (c)". The list contemplated by s 56(1) was published on 23 February 2007. See Lists 
of Critically Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable and Protected Species (2007) (GN R151 of GG 
29657 of 23 February 2007). 
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standards.160 These provisions amount to a delegation of the functions of the 
legislature to the executive and illustrate the important role that must be played by 
the executive in order to ensure that socio-economic rights entrenched in the 
Constitution can be translated into reality. 
 
Bishop and Raboshakga have indicated that the jurisprudence of the Court does not 
provide clear criteria for the exercise of delegated legislative power.161 However, as 
pointed out by the Supreme Court of Appeal, for the purposes of certainty in 
governance, legislative authority delegated to the executive should preferably be 
exercised by way of regulation or rules and not "policy" because the former 
constitute legal instruments which are legally binding.162 However, the reality 
remains that, the exercise of delegated legislative authority does not always find 
expression as regulations and rules and has often been captured under other 
nomenclatures such as codes, strategies, notices and policies. This reality was 
recognised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Akani Garden Route (Pty) Ltd when it 
asserted that:163 
 
The word 'policy' is inherently vague and may bear different meanings.  It 
appears to me to serve little purpose to quote dictionaries defining the word.  
To draw the distinction between what is policy and what is not with 
reference to specificity is, in my view, not always very helpful or necessarily 
correct.  For example, a decision that children below the age of six are 
ineligible for admission to a school, can fairly be called a "policy" and merely 
because the age is fixed does not make it less of a policy than a decision 
that young children are ineligible, even though the word "young" has a 
measure of elasticity in it. Any course or program of action adopted by a 
government may consist of general or specific provisions.   Because of this I 
do not consider it prudent to define the word either in general or in the 
context of the Act.  I prefer to begin by stating the obvious, namely that 
laws, regulations and rules are legislative instruments whereas policy 
determinations are not.  As a matter of sound government, in order to bind 
the public, policy should normally be reflected in such instruments. Policy 
                                                 
160  This provision should be read in conjunction with the obligation imposed on municipalities by s 
4(2)(j) of the Systems Act to "contribute, together with other organs of state, to the progressive 
realisation of the fundamental rights contained in sections 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 
Constitution". 
161  See Bishop and Raboshakga "National Legislative Authority" 17-47 to 17-50. 
162  Akani Garden Route para 7. See Minister of Education paras 10-11; Minister of Health v New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 8 BCLR 872 (CC) para 611. 
163  Akani Garden Route para 7. Own emphasis. See Minister of Education paras 10-11. 
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determinations cannot override, amend or be in conflict with laws (including 
subordinate legislation). Otherwise the separation between legislature and 
executive will disappear. 
 
From the above extract, it clear that the mere fact that an instrument is referred to 
as a policy, code or strategy does not clearly determine its legal consequences.164 
This potentially increases uncertainty in governance. According to Steytler, the most 
important factor to be taken into consideration in determining the legislative effect 
of a policy, code or strategy is the legislative intent of the executive.165 For example, 
the delegated legislative authority to the Minister of Cooperative Government and 
Traditional Affairs to prescribe minimum standards, in consultation with relevant 
stakeholders, for the provision of free basic services to poor households finds 
expression in the form of policy – indigent policies.166 In addition, a national water 
resource strategy developed by the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs 
pursuant to Chapter 2 of the National Water Act167 is intended to be "binding on all 
authorities and institutions exercising powers or performing duties under this Act".168 
It is interesting to note that according to section 6(1)(b)(ii) of the National Water 
Act, the content of the national water resource strategy must set out international 
rights and obligations. It is obvious that if rights and obligations are spelt out in a 
strategy, that strategy can be enforceable to the extent that it creates rights and 
duties. Brand has indicated in the context of socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
that policies aimed at giving effect to socio-economic rights inter alia define the 
obligations of the executive arms of government in relation to those rights and that 
they are enforceable to the extent that such policies create concrete rights or 
entitlements.169 
 
It is now established that although the Constitution is silent on Parliament's powers 
to delegate law-making functions to the executive, this is (to an extent) 
                                                 
164  Steytler 2011 SAPL 488-489. 
165  Steytler 2011 SAPL 488-489. 
166  See National Framework for Municipal Indigent Policies (2006). 
167  National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
168  See Preamble of Chapter 2 and ss 5 and 6 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
169  See Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 16-19. See also Pieterse 2010 Law, 
Democracy and Development 234-235. 
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constitutionally permissible for the purposes of good governance.170 However, there 
is no prescribed manner in which the executive must exercise such powers. This 
allows the executive discretion to decide on how it will exercise delegated legislative 
authority. It appears that when the executive exercises delegated legislative 
authority in the form of policies, strategies or notices, it acts in accordance with the 
constitutional discretion it enjoys. The nomenclature of the instrument used by the 
executive when it exercises delegated legislative powers should therefore not 
automatically determine the legal effect thereof. If exercised in accordance with the 
Constitution and delegating legislation in the form of a policy, such a policy should 
be classified as an executive policy as now established by South African public 
administration experts. 
 
Based on the preceding paragraphs, it can be said that executive policies which seek 
to realise socio-economic rights can be a direct response to the positive duties 
imposed on the executive arm of government to adopt measures to give effect to 
socio-economic rights or to give effect to the provisions of original legislation in the 
field of socio-economic rights. Due to the fact that executive policies derive their 
legal validity from the Constitution or delegated legislation, they should be 
enforceable in a court. The Constitutional Court has established that where a policy 
gives effect to constitutional socio-economic rights, individuals may challenge the 
policy against constitutional norms.171 However, the claims of such individuals must 
be clearly formulated as a constitutional challenge against the policy and not a direct 
claim in terms of the Constitution.172 For example, where a municipal indigent policy 
creates a concrete quantifiable right to social goods for the indigents within its 
jurisdiction, individuals can claim only the quantified right so created by the indigent 
policy except where they wish to challenge the constitutional validity of an indigent 
policy. One of the implications of the ability to enforce (executive) policies that give 
effect to socio-economic rights at especially the local government level is that it has 
                                                 
170  Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature para 51. 
171  Brand "Introduction to Socio-economic Rights" 15-17; Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 594; Mazibuko paras 
71-73; Nokotyana paras 46, 49-50. 
172  See Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 594; Mazibuko para 73; Nokotyana paras 47-50; Du Plessis 2011 PER 95-
96. See also: Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35-39; Van der Walt 2008 Constitutional 
Court Review 99-104. 
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the potential of creating an avalanche of avenues through which socio-economic 
rights claims could be located. For example, a community resident could claim a 
right of access to sufficient water either based on the Constitution, on legislation or 
on a municipal indigent policy. In the absence of awareness, it becomes difficult for 
community residents to legally ground their claims. In other words, they may for 
example demand that their right of access to water should be fulfilled and in the 
absence of awareness it becomes difficult to identify if this claim should be grounded 
in a municipal indigent policy, the national indigent policy, a by-law, the Water 
Services Act173 or the Constitution.174 
 
4 Review of cases where courts enforced "executive" policies 
 
Although it may be difficult to draw broad conclusions from the Constitutional Court's 
jurisprudence in particular, because it often considers it irrelevant to make 
broad/binding decisions when dealing with constitutional matters,175 the ability and 
willingness of courts to enforce executive policies is evident from a number of socio-
economic rights cases. 
 
In B v Minister of Correctional Services,176 the applicants, HIV-positive inmates of 
Pollsmoor Prison, approached the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, with an 
application for an order declaring inter alia that they and all HIV-positive prisoners 
with a CD4 count of less than 500/ml should be entitled to receive anti-retroviral 
medication at State expense as consistent with their section 35(2)(e) constitutional 
right to adequate medical treatment.177 In the absence of "firm guidelines relating to 
anti-retroviral treatment of HIV prisoners", and informed by the Department of 
Correctional Services operating principle that "prisoners should have access to health 
services and treatment equal to that provided to persons attending health facilities 
                                                 
173  Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
174  For a similar type of reasoning, see Hattingh Governmental Relations 56-57. 
175  For example, the Constitutional Court has evaded all opportunities to give content to socio-
economic rights. See Grootboom paras 29-33. In Minister of Education, the Constitutional Court 
refused to make a decision on the legal effect of a notice published by the then Minister of 
Education. See paras 10-13. 
176  B v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 6 BCLR 789 (C). 
177  B v Minister paras 1-4. 
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of provincial hospitals", the court expressed its willingness to extend the provincial 
hospital's policy on the treatment of AIDS patients to prisoners.178 The provincial 
hospital's policy defined the extent to which the executive was committed to 
realising the right of access to adequate health services for members of the public 
that were infected by AIDS. According to this policy, full-blown AIDS persons 
attending public health facilities qualified for ARV treatment at the State's expense if 
their CD4 count was less than 200/ml but more than 50/ml.179 The court indicated 
that at the very least, HIV positive prisoners should receive the same treatment 
enjoyed by members of the public who attend provincial public hospitals.180 
However, considering that the main issue under contention was what constitutes 
"adequate" medical treatment in terms of section 35(2)(e),181 the court indicated 
that it lacked institutional competence to determine for medical doctors and the 
executive the content of that right.182 The court held that since medical experts had 
translated what constitutes adequate medical treatment for the first and second 
applicants (including a prison doctor for the second applicant) through prescription, 
they had given concrete form to the constitutional right of prisoners to adequate 
medical treatment which it was prepared to uphold.183 The court ordered that anti-
retroviral treatment should be extended to the first and second applicant because 
they were entitled to receive it on prescribed medical grounds.184 What is important 
to note for current purposes is that in the absence of a challenge on constitutional 
compliance, the court was willing to apply to prisoners the provincial hospital policy 
on the treatment of members of the public infected with AIDS. 
 
In Dudley Lee v Minister of Correctional Service,185 the Constitutional Court declared 
that the respondents were liable for delictual damages suffered by the applicant 
when he contracted tuberculosis (TB) while in detention because  the responsible 
                                                 
178  B v Minister para 24. 
179  B v Minister paras 24-25. 
180  B v Minister para 24. 
181  B v Minister para 41. 
182  B v Minister paras 32, 34. 
183  B v Minister paras 31, 35-36, 60. 
184  B v Minister paras 60, 61. 
185  In Dudley Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 2 BCLR 129 (CC) (hereafter Dudley Lee). 
For details on the facts of this case, see paras 1-10. 
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Correctional Services authorities failed to take preventative and precautionary 
measures to prevent the applicant from contracting TB as required by Standing 
Correctional Orders (SCOs).186 The SCOs were specifically adopted pursuant to 
sections 2(a)-(b) and 12 of the Correctional Services Act187 to define health 
measures that were supposed to be implemented by prison authorities in order to 
cater for the health of detainees and prevent the spread of contagious diseases 
amongst inmates.188 The Constitutional Court held that non-adherence to the SCOs 
by responsible authorities violated inter alia the applicant's constitutional right to 
medical treatment at state expense as required by section 35(2)(e) of the 
Constitution.189 What is important to note in this context is the fact that the 
Constitutional Court used obligations delimited by the executive through the SCOs to 
establish negligence and general non-compliance with the constitutional right of 
detained persons to receive adequate medical treatment by the Minister for 
Correctional Services. 
 
In Nokotyana, the Constitutional Court found that the municipality acted reasonably 
in terms of its obligations to provide basic services to the applicants within the 
context of Chapters 12 and 13 of the National Housing Code.190 According to 
Chapter 13, the municipality could not invest in capital-intensive services in informal 
settlements except after the MEC's approval for the upgrade of such informal 
settlements. The main reason behind this policy position is to eliminate "fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure" by municipalities.191 In addition, Chapter 12 of the National 
Housing Code allows for essential assistance to be provided in cases of emergency 
only subject to the determination of an emergency by the MEC.192 The Court decided 
this case based on the nature of obligations that the executive had concretised for 
municipalities, through policy, in order to contribute towards realising the 
                                                 
186  See Dudley Lee paras 37, 59-71 and 77. 
187  Correctional Service Act 111 of 1998. S 11 of the Correctional Service Act defines the obligations 
of the Department of Correctional Services re the rights of prisoners to receive adequate health 
care services. 
188  For details on relevant provisions of the SCOs, see Dudley Lee para 9. 
189  See Dudley Lee paras 61-65. 
190  Nokotyana paras 42-44. 
191  Nokotyana para 43. 
192  Nokotyana paras 32-40. 
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constitutional right of access to adequate housing and other basic services. In this 
connection and possibly overlooking the constitutional basis for enforcing executive 
policies, Bilchitz criticised the Court for giving policy the force of legislation in the 
Nokotyana case without a clear justification.193 
 
In Mazibuko, litigation centred on the constitutional validity – reasonableness – of 
the City's Free Basic Water policy and indigent policy, especially in terms of the 
sufficiency of the quantity of water guaranteed therein for the purposes of human 
dignity.194 This case  demonstrates that, if the quantity of water guaranteed in those 
policy documents was ''sufficient", residents could claim the supply of that quantity 
as consistent with their constitutional right of access to sufficient water. This 
thinking is discernable in the Constitutional Court's undecided position with regards 
to the application of the principle of "constitutional subsidiarity" in relation to the 
City's Free Basic Water policy.195 
 
In Minister of Education v Harris, relying wrongly on section 3(4) of the National 
Education Policy Act,196 the Minister of Education published a notice which imposed 
that a learner may not be enrolled for grade one in an independent school if he/she 
did not reach the age of seven in the same calendar year.197 The Court declared 
ultra vires the policy decision of the Minister of Education, inter alia on the ground 
that the National Education Policy Act did not empower the minister to impose 
binding legal obligations on provinces, parents and independent institutions.198 
However, it appears from the unanimous judgment written by Sachs J that had the 
minister relied on section 5(4) of the South African Schools Act,199 which expressly 
empowered him/her to determine the age at which pupils should be admitted into 
independent institutions as well as public schools, such a policy determination would 
                                                 
193  Bilchitz 2010 SALJ 598. 
194  See Mazibuko paras 6, 51, 71-77. 
195  Mazibuko paras 73-76. Dugard has generally criticised the Constitutional Court judgment in 
Mazibuko for failing to advance the interests of the poor. See Dugard ''Civic Action and Legal 
Mobilisation'' 71-99; Dugard 2010 Review of Radical Political Economics 175-194. 
196  National Education Policy Act 27 of 1996. 
197  See Minister of Education paras 1-3. 
198  See Minister of Education paras 10-20. 
199  South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
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have had a binding legal effect.200 In Minister of Education v Harris the Court 
therefore ruled on the illegality of a ministerial policy determination that was 
grounded on a wrong legislation as opposed to the legal effect of a ministerial policy 
determination that is consistent with legislation.201 
 
The approach of the Constitutional Court on the enforcement of executive policies 
giving effect to socio-economic rights in the above cases appears ad hoc. Its 
jurisprudence in a number of cases - B v Minister of Correctional Services; Dudley 
Lee; and Mazibuko suggest that, where an executive policy delimits and self-imposes 
obligations on the executive arm of government, the Court will easily enforce such 
self-imposed obligations. The same applies to instances where executive policies 
create objective legal entitlements for the poor in particular. However, it seems that 
the Court is slow to enforce executive policies when they purport to impose duties 
on third parties. In enforcing executive policies in Nokotyana, the court does not 
clearly explain that the basis for the enforcement of policies such as the Housing 
Code lies in the fact that legislation expressly delegates powers to the executive to 
adopt such a policy in terms of the Housing Act. To the contrary, in Harris v Minister 
of Education the Court decides the case on the basis of delegated legislative 
authority. It held that the notice published by the Minister could not be enforced 
because it was ultra vires. Instead of clearly pronouncing that the policy would have 
been binding if the Minister had relied on the correct legislation, Justice Sachs leaves 




The purpose of this article was to critically reflect on the status and possible 
constitutional basis for the judicial enforcement of executive policies that give effect 
to socio-economic rights in South Africa. This article has demonstrated that the basis 
for the enforcement of executive policies that give effect to socio-economic rights 
can be situated in the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the positive duties 
                                                 
200  See Minister of Education paras 15-18. 
201  See Minister of Education para 19. 
202  See Minister of Education paras 15-18. 
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imposed on the government to "adopt reasonable legislative and other measures" to 
give effect to relevant socio-economic rights. This article has argued and 
demonstrated that these positive duties amount to a constitutional delegation to the 
executive branch of government to use governance instruments such as executive 
policies to give effect to socio-economic rights. A review of selected cases has 
revealed that courts have enforced executive policies giving effect to socio-economic 
rights based on the obligation imposed on government to adopt reasonable 
legislative and other measures to realise socio-economic rights. This reasoning of the 
Court is discernable from the cases reviewed: B v Minister of Correctional Services; 
Mazibuko; Nokotyana; and Dudley Lee. In addition, it argued that where executive 
policies are adopted pursuant to delegated legislative authority, they are enforceable 
to the extent that they are consistent with relevant delegating legislation and the 
Constitution. It has been established through a number of Constitutional Court cases 
that although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the legislature to 
delegate law-making powers to the executive, it is permissible for purposes of good 
governance for original legislation to delegate regulatory powers to the executive: 
Constitutionality of the Mpumalanga Petitions Bill; Executive Council, Western Cape 
Legislature; and Justice Alliance. In addition, it has been established that the 
executive often has discretion on how it exercises delegated law-making powers. 
This could take the form of a regulation, policy, code or strategy. 
 
This author hopes that the above exposition will help in clarifying the confusion 
surrounding the legal status and possible basis for the enforcement of executive 
policies that give effect to socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
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